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CONSIDERATIONS

ON THE

AMERICAN WAR,

Under the following HEADS.

AMERICAN INDEPENDENCY.
PURSUIT of the WAR.
WAR of POSTS.
PLAN of OPERATION.
FRENCH POLICY.

By JOSEPH WILLIAMS, Esq.

Experientia Docet.
Nec amore quisquam, et sine odio dicendus est.

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TO THE

PUBLIC:

HAVING commenced my Soldierſhip at the age of fifteen, and having diſcharged the duty of an Officer for twenty years. I made, during that time, politics my ſtudy.—I therefore have a right to offer the fruits of that ſtudy to my Country, hoping more beneſit will accrue to the public, than what it afforded me.——A Command of four years in America, gives me as great a title to write on the ſubject, as Dean Tucker *can claim, by ſpeculating out of the pale of his profeſſion: and I have a right to think, that was a Miniſter to adopt me as his hero, I ſhould acquit myſelf as well as any that have been employed ſince the fate of* Wolf. *——But ſince the occupation of my ſword is gone, yet my Country, I hope, will not frown at that of my pen.*

CONSIDERATIONS

OF THE

AMERICAN WAR, &c.

AN opposition to governments' measures in America, originated at Boston; the great debts of the factors stimulated the spirit of that opposition: The conduct of governors, the pusillanimity of power, the neglect and irresolution of administration, with encouragement from opposition at home, fed the flames of their defection: Faction set up the banner of liberty, every concession increased their demand, until they threw the word Independency into the scale.

Yet, before they accepted the protection of the French, their independency, in my opinion, meant no more than a ſocial commercial compact limited to our advantage, under our protection and prohibitions.

In an unfortunate hour, Unconditional Submiſſion was thrown into the oppoſite ſcale againſt Independency. Here ended every ſalutary hope of reconciliation, and here commenced an Independency, under the idea of Empire, acknowledged and ſupported by the French, leagued with them in the moſt determined and offenſive operations.

The meeting between LORD HOWE and DOCTOR FRANKLIN has not been explained to the public: LORD HOWE had full power, and the DOCTOR was delegated by Congreſs to ſettle matters; they had agreed on Eſſentials, but the DOCTOR would inſert the word Independence; then LORD HOWE declared, nothing but Unconditional Submiſſion would ſatisfy, and broke off the conference.

It is now to be conſidered, what ſteps are to be taken, what mode of conduct to be adopted, and what reſolutions to be purſued, to guard againſt the conſequences, and to preſerve at leaſt, the appearance of the Britiſh Empire ſtill ſubſiſting.——To this end, a diſcuſſion under the following heads, is neceſſary:

AMERICAN INDEPENDENCY.
A PURSUIT of the WAR.
A WAR of POSTS.
A PLAN of OPERATION.
FRENCH POLICY.

AMERICAN

AMERICAN INDEPENDENCY.

HAVING pointed out what is meant by American Independency in the foregoing preamble, it is to be conſidered, whether we are to acknowledge their Independency of Empire; and if we do, in what manner. It is a difficult matter to ſteer opinion, between Adminiſtration and Oppoſition, both violent, both oppreſſive, and abſolute in their expectations of ſubmiſſion to their political tenets, all that can be done, is to offer ſentiments free from partiality, and they are as free to approve or cenſure. The Americans have proceeded to the laſt extremity, by confiſcating the eſtates of the Loyaliſts; ſucceſs in their military operations, has removed from them the dread of ſeverity, and altho' they muſt admit of the courage of an Engliſh ſoldier, yet I fear the French, and their own experience have taught them to deſpiſe and hold cheap the conduct and abilities of our commanders.

A ſeparate treaty we muſt not expect, did we even acknowledge their Independency; the parties with whom they are connected muſt dictate the terms, millions muſt go to pay their debts to the French, and England muſt find thoſe millions as the baſis of a treaty, if it ſhould ever take place; a limitation of our commerce, our power, and our navy, would likewiſe be preſcribed. It would be the greateſt humiliation, the higheſt imprudence to treat with France and Spain, until we have reduced their marine to the proper ſtandard that policy requires.

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The Advocates for American Independency, would do well to conſider, that admitting and forming ſuch an Empire, would be reducing us to our Inſular conſequence, and having loſt the dominion of the ſeas, make us a meer cypher in the political ſcale of Europe.

It will be advanced, that we were as great a nation before we colonized America, as we are at preſent; granted, but let it be known, that the political ſyſtem of every power in Europe, is entirely altered; formerly, internal ſtrength conſtituted the power of a nation: To ſubvert a riſing Empire, ſhould be the care of Europe as well as ours.

The French afford us already their pity for the fall of ſo great an Empire, ſo great a revolution; they look down upon our deſtruction as certain, and that we ſoon will become a Province to them: and this grounded on the Independency of America, on which hinge our power and being depends. Wide is the difference between dependence and protection, and conqueſt and ſubmiſſion. To draw that line requires great moderation and judgment.

There is a political juſtice due to ourſelves, there is likewiſe a natural juſtice that will countenance ſeverity; and if independence cannot be acknowledged but to our own deſtruction, whether immediately or in conſequence through the eye of policy, ſeverity then is mercy. I am perſuaded none will talk of American Independency, but ſuch who have ſecretly combined, encouraged, and ſupported their defection, having private views, reſentment, and ſchemes, more than national objects before their eyes. I ſhall proceed next to conſider what diſadvantages their

Indepen-

Independency would occaſion to this nation, I will not ſay Empire, which name we muſt loſe, by the loſs of ſuch extenſive territories.

MONTESQUIEU tells us that "It is a fundamental law of Europe, that all commerce with a foreign colony is regarded as a monopoly to the mother country," which is acknowledging a dependency. The commerce advantageous to the mother country, muſt be exportations of all her manufactures, and a prohibition to the colonies trading with other powers, except through the medium of acts of trade laid down for their mutual advantage; this may be termed a ſocial compact, with limitations that the mother country ſhould be the ſtaple for the produce that the colonies can ſend to market: Whether that produce ſerves for neceſſary uſe, or luxury, matters not; as it increaſes the revenue, and ſtrengthens the ſinews of power to afford them protection.

This copula not only increaſes the power, but likewiſe the manufactures, and inland commerce of the mother country: To go further than this, and lay taxes on the Provinces, would be impoſing the terms of conqueſt, which is totally repugnant to the principles of a commercial ſtate. I have not the leaſt doubt, but that all the Provinces in America, would have purchaſed an Independency of trade from us, at a very large ſtipend or tax.—Was that tax equal to the mines of Mexico and Peru, it would do us no more good than thoſe mines do the Spaniards: By no means to be compared to the wealth, the advantages, and bleſſings that commerce pours out of her multiplying ſtreams upon us.

The conſequences of American Independency, I fear is not well underſtood: If we examine, and weigh this great queſtion in the political ſcale, the iſlands have the ſame plea, the ſame pretenſions, and ſame inclinations with the Americans, to be independent; or to throw themſelves under the protection of any other power, that will lure them to a defection, by an appearance of advantage: Self-intereſt the great principle of human actions, works as ſtrong in America and the iſlands, as it does in Great Britain.

In the infancy of America, Great-Britain, from her Inſular ſituation, had every advantage over the other ſtates of Europe, as a maritime power. When America gained ſtrength, and that ſtrength was added to ours; our ſovereignty of the ſeas was indiſputable, and acknowledged by all the world. It is a plain truth, and perplex'd with no intricacies, that the political balance, in our favour, was kept ſteady by the additional weight that our foreign territories threw into the ſcale. Give up this great point of dependency to America; and let them caſt their force into the oppoſite ſcale; you then will, too late feel their power: And that they will join the reſt of the world, to level your ſuperiority to a ſtandard of equality, is obvious to every idea of policy, as well as common ſenſe. No compact, no treaty, will bind them beyond temporary conveniency.—Their extent of country, of coaſt, their great rivers, their knowledge of trade, arts, and manufactures, will ſoon ſwallow up the conſequence of Little England.

I hope

I hope, I have made it appear that our political ſalvation depends upon this important ſtruggle; this infinite availment that determines our Empire. How much American Independency will affect our trade, and internal commerce of this kingdom, I ſhall endeavour to explain.

The Independency of America being granted or accompliſhed.—By means of their fiſhery they will immediately open their trade with the Levant.—The African ſlave trade they can carry on to greater advantage than we can, the plantations will go to the beſt market.—Spain and France are nearer to them by a months ſailing than we are; therefore will be a ſtaple for their commodities.——The cheapneſs of land will enable them to raiſe flax, that will ſoon overturn the linen trade of Ireland, which they ſeem not to be ſenſible of. By raiſing of hemp, they will ſupply all the Weſtern and Southern world with cordage. The cutlery and founderies one of the principle manufactories of this kingdom, will ſoon flouriſh in America; where they have plenty of fuel and ores in every Province, and withal an induſtry untainted with luxury.

The woollen manufactory will ſtill remain in England for half a century. It will take that time before the woods in America will be ſufficiently cleared to allow of extenſive downs, and ſheep walks, to bring that branch of our commerce into a rivalſhip with us. The conſumption of all our manufactories, will be ſtopped with America; they poſſeſs every ingredient, and will give irreſiſtable encouragement for artiſts to ſettle amongſt them, what remains for us then, but to exert every nerve of the Empire, every influence of policy, to bring them back to their dependency by mildneſs or ſeverity.

Will the Advocates for the American Independency, place our ſituation in a juſter light, ſhould that event take place? will they conſider how difficult it is to retrench in luxury? to return to a primitive ſimplicity? to acquieſce with ſumptuary laws? which will be the conſequence, when we are left as a ſimple nation, without reſources to ſettle our finances, with the gloomy proſpect; the certainty, of a general bankruptcy.

The precipice ſtaggers the political brain, and deſpair attends every information.—A fortunate event yet may happen to redeem us and prevent the Independency, which if obtained will be our ruin. However, let us not be elated with extravagant hopes; we have had a trial of fortune, and owe more to her, than to our own conduct.

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A PURSUIT OF THE WAR.

SHALL we purſue the war in America with redoubled vigour, or rather expence? common ſenſe forbids, experience forbids, and indeed the eventual advantages, did we ſucceed, would never atone for the expence of blood and treaſure expended in the attempt. By ſuch a reſolution we ſtill aim at conqueſt, and purſue the means of preventing it; we exhauſt ourſelves, and enrich them, we ſhould endeavour to cut off their ſprings: The French are their ſprings, deſtroy their fleet, and every hoſtile combination will dwindle away. Who does not feel horror for what is paſt? or who does not tremble for our future fate?

A continental war in Europe, has always drained this country; how deſtructive then muſt a continental war be acroſs the Atlantic? The money we ſend there feeds the war, every defeat of the Americans leads them to victory, and every campaign is a ſchool of military inſtruction to them.

Since LORD CHATHAM's adoption of GENERAL WOLF, it has been the rage for Miniſters to ſet up their own heroes, to the prejudice of veterans, as well as the ſervice.

The ancients were ſo poſſeſt with an idea that a providence, a fate, or a fortune, interfered with the actions of men, that they thought prudence and courage inſufficient for ſucceſs, if a General was not likewiſe

fortunate: If inauſpicious Miniſters are ſupported, inauſpicious Generals will be ſo likewiſe.

General Burgoyne tells us, that his command in 1777, to the northern expedition, was not one of private favour, court intrigue, or perſonal ambition; I ſhall only remark, that there are officers of experience who join with me in thinking, that had he compleated his plan of conjunction with General Sir William Howe, not conſidering the enormous expence, that junction would not have added one ſtep to a ſubjugation, unleſs a chain of Poſts had been maintained from Montreal to New York; ten thouſand men muſt have been left for ſuch a diſtrict.

To what end was a little army given to Lord Rawdon? or what policy directed Lord Cornwallis to carry on an infernal war? If the plans originated in the cabinet, the cabinet could act only from repreſentation. It has been the misfortune of the cabinet to judge on partial information: I wiſh to reaſon from principle, more than from bitterneſs of heart, and that I had other arguments to uſe, than painful conſequences: whatever ſchemes offer that flatters the ſyſtem adopted, is embraced, nor will the ſmart of all our misfortunes, induce them to liſten to the advice of diſintereſted integrity.

Lord Cornwallis was a good man, and a popular man, yet without a command, his Lordſhip would have thought his time thrown away in garriſon duty at New-York; hence a continental war was improvidently undertaken, that his Lordſhip might have a command. Had the conteſt be-

between us and the Americans been our only concern, ſound policy would have reprobated any internal excurſions.

The plans, however, unfortunately determined, the executive part by Lord Cornwallis and General Burgoyne, miſcarried by the ſame errors, to throw blame on adminiſtration, when they failed in the execution is not warrantable.—One thing I am bold to advance, that our Miniſters have not conſidered that the grand tactick of war, and the command of armies, requires experience and abilities, very different from the minutiæ of St. James's parade.

Cæsar, before he undertook any expedition, exclaimed—*res frumentaria compacta.* His magazines were formed, he took care his communications ſhould be open and ſecure.—Had our heroes done the ſame, their fate would not have diſgraced our annals, a diſgrace under ſimilar circumſtances; hiſtory does not record, ſince the Caudine Forks.

A retreat has often gained as much honour as a victory, and is the great maſter-piece of war, to apply general principles to particular caſes, may appear prejudicial, but we have no other way of judging of particular caſes, until the ſprings and motions, of ſuch actions, have been explained.

Six thouſand men could have made a retreat, in defiance of 20,000 men, had a communication and Poſt been ſecured: when a General has once taken the field, no directions of a Miniſter, however poſitively framed, ought to influence his operations.

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He ſhould act from circumſtances, which no foreſight can comprehend, if the Miniſter has not confidence in his General, he ſhould ſend deputies to attend the army, to act by their advice, to frame poſitive directions; for expeditions can be only conditional, and the General who undertakes them, is anſwerable for the conſequences.

Our armies in America prided themſelves too much on the brilliancy of caſual rencounters; this intoxicated and led them to deſpiſe an enemy half armed, badly cloathed, and rudely diſciplined. The prudent, patient intrepidity of the American Generals, ſaw it, and availed themſelves of the conſequences. Depredations on the inland villages, where magazines were not formed, was unnatural, impolitic, and ſerved only to irritate by fire and carnage, what milder treatment might have reconciled. Strictures on the miſconduct and miſcarriage of the paſt, is not my intention, further than to draw leſſons for our future management of a conteſt, teeming with events of ſuch conſequence, that will affect the peace of the whole globe. As this ſubject is cloſely connected with the following, I ſhall further conſider it under

A WAR OF POSTS.

I HAVE heard of a reſolution taken to carry on the American war with vigour, but to alter the mode, and to make it a war of Poſts: before the war, we had ſmall Poſts on the lakes, on the rivers, and back ſettlements, they were to defend the Setlers from the inroads of the ſavages, the

the Americans have diſpoſſeſſed us of thoſe Poſts. What other troops we had in America, were to keep poſſeſſion of ſettlements taken from the French, except ſome troops making New York head quarters.

What is meant now by a War of Poſts, I know not, the American war according to my opinion, is a War of Poſts, excepting the expeditions already noticed; yet carried on at a greater expence, than would maintain ſixty thouſand men in the field, and the Poſts not tenable, without an immenſe fleet employed half the year to protect them. Boſton was a Poſt, evacuated; Rhode Iſland was a Poſt, quitted; Philadelphia was a Poſt, given up; ſome Poſts given up from clemency, and others from neceſſity, arrangements no ſooner formed than fruſtrated, Commanders no ſooner appointed than diſgraced, Generals laying faults on Admirals, and their faults retorted, the Miniſters diſtracted with complaints, and no examples to deter, nor enquiries to ſatisfy the public.

If conqueſt is meant by a War of Poſts, an hundred thouſand men are inſufficient, if conqueſt is not meant, ten thouſand are ample, as I ſhall prove in my plan of operation. New York is not tenable without a fleet, and there have we been beſieged theſe five years, always garriſoned with twelve to twenty thouſand men.

It has been a matter of wonder, that the army at New York has not been captured; it appears to me that WASHINGTON's movement to the Jerſeys, was a decoy for GENERAL CLINTON to follow him, in which caſe, the French fleet was intended to enter the harbour and cut him

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off. The French fleet could not have been informed of our Poſt at York, which was an accident.

The laſt war, we conquered France in America, now we have no way of repoſſeſſing America, but by purſuing the French fleet whenever they are to be found: all thoughts of conqueſts in America ſhould ſubſide, all thoughts of commerce ſhould be ſuſpended, even with the Weſt Indies; at beſt a commerce of luxury, as far as it interfered with the naval armament. The French ſacrificed every conſideration to that of forming their navy equal to ours; it is our laſt ſtake to ſacrifice every thing to deſtroy that navy; that done, we accompliſh our other wiſhes at leiſure.

Every ſtrong Poſt we poſſeſs, is ſo much power, ſo much treaſure withheld from the ſtrength of our fleet; any land army weakens the nerve of exertion required to make our navy ſuperior to all other powers, without this ſuperiority, it is vain to think of ſecuring our conqueſts abroad, or our ſecurity at home.

A PLAN OF OPERATION.

THE firſt conſideration is to recruit the navy; the marines would make good ſailors; ſix regiments of infantry ſhould be drawn from New York, to ſerve as marines immediately, and the fleet be continually replaced in that manner; field officers ſhould attend flags, and from thoſe

thoſe field officers, Governors ſhould be choſen for garriſons. All ſoldiers ſhould receive douceurs, to exchange their knapſacks for the jacket.

When a regiment embarks to ſerve as marines, the officer ſhould have a power to give diſcharges, if they are willing to be enrolled in the ſhips books, if approved of, volunteers ſhould be allowed out of the ranks, when men of war arrive in the harbour where there are garriſons.

The towns of Boſton, New York, Newport, and Philadelphia, ſhould be deſtroyed, Charles-Town, ſhould be made the place of arms, and magazine of ſtores, and I would have no other Poſt where a land army could aſſail, or where the garriſon could have communication with the country. Halifax is tenable, and ſo is Louiſburgh, two thouſand men in each garriſon, with 3000 in Quebec, the plains of Abram, very well fortified, and three thouſand in Charles-Town, are all the Poſts I would maintain; if a Poſt could be maintained between Cape-Henry, and Cape-Cod, it would be more eligible than Louiſburgh.—There may appear cruelty in deſtroying the towns of Boſton, New-York, and Philadelphia, as theſe towns have flouriſhed under our protection, under the idea of an extenſion of commerce, and not a foundation of Empire: a reform ſhould take place. In juſtice to ourſelves, we ſhould ſend a fleet into their harbours, apprize the inhabitants of our intentions, allow them a week to carry their effects into the country, then ſet fire to the towns.

Let it be remembered, that this idea is only a political plan, advanced by no temper of cruelty, nor ſentiment of deſpight, but guided by a concern,

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for the preſervation of our own Empire, looking beyond temporary expediency, and preparing for future prevention.

Delenda eſt Carthago, was abſolutely neceſſary for the ſucceſs, if not for the preſervation of the Roman Empire.—The French may think the ſame of England, but if it is neceſſary that England ſhould think ſo of America, we ſhould not heſitate to reduce her to the ſituation ſhe was in 50 years ago, our ſafety requires it, that we ſhould not ſuffer thoſe towns as places of ſtrength, which in the end, the French may poſſeſs and fortify to ſhelter their navy and increaſe their power. The French intentions are explained by the quantity of bricks they embarked with their laſt fleet.

When the fate of our Empire is at ſtake, mercy is the language only, of women and children, in ſuch a ſituation, ſeverity is mercy, and it is mercy to ourſelves, to ſtrike that blow in America, which, elſe we ſhould feel at our own doors. Was there any proſpect of drawing the Americans from their new allies, or fortifying the harbours without deſtroying the towns, ſuch a ſtop would be inadviſable, but as theſe hopes are vain, the meaſure appears in its full force, as neceſſary to preſerve our force of commerce, and political exiſtence as an independent power. The Newfoundland fleet will be ſtationed at Louiſburgh, as centrical, and immediately commanding the gulph of St. Laurence, and the Banks, unleſs of the harbour of Halifax, as fortified, might be thought more eligible, but the ledges of the Sambro rocks, and the length of the harbour, in my opinion, with the iſle of Sable, has its diſadvantages as a Poſt, which Louiſburgh, if fortified, would not feel. The gentlemen of the navy, are the beſt judges.

A number of armed veſſels drawing little water, ſhould be continually cruizing, to explore all the harbours in the Bay of Fundy, New-England, New-York, and the harbours of the Delaware, and Cheſapeak. It were to be wiſhed, a Poſt could be maintained between Cape-Henry, and Cape-Cod, but I know of no ſuch ſituation, that could not be inveſtigated by WASHINGTON's army.

The Poſts formed, would be in no danger of offenſive operation from the American troops, the expence of embarking an army, Mr. WASHINGTON would not be able to accompliſh, nor attempt, as ſuch an attempt would be at the mercy of our ſhipping.

Where any fortifications were diſcovered to be erecting, or veſſels of burthen, or force are building; a report ſhould be made as ſoon as poſſible, to the Governor of Halifax, and the Admiral on that ſtation. The towns of Halifax, and Louiſburgh, ſhould likewiſe be free for the Americans to trade; the Governor ſhould grant paſsports to the American veſſels to fiſh on the Banks, under proper reſtrictions, they ſhould allow them no veſſels above a certain burthen. The garriſons of Louiſburgh, and Halifax, ſhould be ſupplied with coal from the pits of Cape-Breton.

The Americans left to themſelves, would ſoon be tired of their new allies; their hands would be fully employed in building new towns; the conteſt would then chiefly reſt between the French and us. If fate ordains that Armerica ſhould be a new Empire, we ſhould leave their independency to them, but not acknowledge it; they would have no way of diſcharging their debts to the French; to avoid that payment, the ſame

motives that induced them to break with us, in a little time will ſecede them from a power ſo oppoſite in religion, principle, and manners, from themſelves. Their internal taxes will ſoon unlooſe their bond of union.

Above all things, our fleet ſhould not ſpend their time in ſieges unprofitable to government, but make the ſhipping of the enemy their only object and attention: nor ſhould the defence of our own iſlands be an excuſe to keep them in harbour; that iſland that cannot defend itſelf for a month, is not an object for us to defend: and as I ſaid before, the commerce of the iſlands ſhould be ſuſpended, if it interferes with our naval operations. To this object, we ſhould give all our attention, to ſtrengthen this object, our forces ſhould be withdrawn from America, excepting 10,000 men, divided between four grand Poſts. This conduct would ſilence oppoſition; at leaſt they muſt change their ground, and if any period would put an end to our diſcords at home; it is a reſolution of purſuing our faithleſs enemies; and a ceſſation of hoſtilities with America, may throw a ray of comfort over our calamities. One complete victory over the French fleet, will turn the tide of affairs in our favour, to effect this, every nerve ſhould be exerted, every inſtrument of political, commercial, and conſtitutional engine, ſhould be employed.

As a profeſſional man, I confeſs there are ſtrong objections to the ſcheme of recruiting the navy, from the military; as it militates againſt the emulation of diſcipline, neceſſary to form good troops; and may cauſe ſuch regiments to relax in their diſcipline, when they are liable to be ſo drafted. Garriſon duty will require leſs preparation than the field. A well formed

plan,

plan, ſhould render the military as beneficial as poſſible to the marine; whoſe operations alone can extricate us from the predicaments, and embarraſſments, which threatens the ruin of this country.

A navy ſituated on the other ſide the Atlantic, will unavoidably be expoſed to loſſes, which cannot be repaired, but by uncommon methods: A plan regulated with the military, can recruit them with men. How neceſſary it is therefore, that a good underſtanding ſhould always ſubſiſt between parties, who muſt on every caſual event co-operate. If the military operations are confined to Poſts; there will be fewer opportunities for jealouſy; and the ſervice being contracted to the naval department, may be carried on with vigour and ſucceſs.

Procraſtination attends the very nature of a campaign: The incidents of action delayed, and depending on a heavy train, and eſtabliſhing magazines, with other circumſtances, ſo interwoven with the purſuits of contractors, power, and emoluments; that the principle of the war is loſt in the operation; and a thouſand diſappointments and diſaſters counteracts the intention, and ſpins out the concluſion.

It is not ſo with the fleet—the finances once ſettled, they are fitted out at home with all materials, and every ſhip compleated depends on itſelf, for its ſtores, and all the appointments of war. The great conſideration, is a mode to recruit them with men, to appoint able commanders, and employ veteran officers; all the expence of equipment circulates at home;

all

all the ſpoils of the enemy is brought to our hive: How different the effects of the navy and army; all the expences, tho' immenſe, I may ſay, enriches this country, which is laid out on the fleet; whereas all the expence of the army in America impoveriſhes us, and enriches the enemy. And how different the effect of their operations: To what purpoſe will an army overrun a country that it cannot maintain? or what atonement to this country, for the capture of two armies; that would have manned a fleet of twenty ſail of the line. Whereas one compleat victory at ſea will be deciſive; conqueſts of Iſlands, and ſubmiſſion of Provinces, would immediately follow.

Hence it is, we ſee the wide difference between the principles of a war, and the operation: The latter ſhould never loſe ſight of the cauſe; yet we ſee too often the principle is loſt in the operation.

To make our navy equal to the three powers of France, Spain, and Holland, is hardly poſſible; eſpecially if it is true, that France alone employs ſix thouſand men in her docks; whereas we do not half the number in ours. Yet they are very deficient to us in their equipments, in the hardineſs of their men, and their management of their ſhipping, particularly in hard weather.

It has often been a ſurpriſe to me, that we have built no men of war in America; Halifax has a dock-yard, and there is not a Setler in the Province, who cannot handle his axe and adz. They might have compleated two ſhips of the line annually, at a ſmall expence to government: Very little

little of that part of Nova Scotia, called Acadia, is granted from the Crown. Our men of war know very little of the coaſt, from Fort Cumberland, or Bay of Verte, to Gabe Bay; that coaſt at high tide has no more than three fathom water; except at the rivers of Riſtagouch, Miramachee, and the Bay of Chaleur.

The ſea coaſt from its aſpect, does not promiſe timber for ſhip building, As there, the foreſt ſeems to be fringed with ſmall pine, ſtarved trees, and underwood; the borders of the rivers, are the ſame as the ſea coaſt; but in all the rivers, there are creeks, at the end of thoſe creeks, there grow very large timber; immenſe pines, and larch trees: I did not obſerve the oak grew tall, but excellent ſhip timber: They make a diſtinction by calling it white oak, and inferior to Engliſh oak; yet if ſheathed with copper I ſhould think it would anſwer. There are likewiſe the wytch hazel, and black birch, excellent timber as I have been informed for ſhipping.—It was my remark, that creeks which run South Weſt bore the largeſt timber.

How to prepare this timber for the ſtocks is the buſineſs of the navy, and the Admiral at Halifax. Ships might likewiſe be built at Quebec and New-York; could they ſecure dock-yards from the treachery of the country. The timber muſt be cut down and carried to Halifax by the King's ſhips, ſtationed in the gulph of St. Laurence, which in times of peace uſed to be a frigate and ſloop of war: I would recommend flat-bottomed veſſels to attend the King's ſhips in the ſpring or fall, that can run into the rivers; half a dozen carpenters with their falling axes, and a compa-

ny of ſoldiers to protect them from the Indians, and French Acadians on the coaſt, would load much timber in a week; the ſoldiers with tackle would ſoon float the timber, prepared by the carpenters; this buſineſs muſt be performed early in the ſpring, or late in autumn, it is impoſſible to live in the woods in the ſummer, for Muſquito flies.

The ſervice pointed out will be diſagreeable to the navy, as well as military—unleſs a general ardour, and enthuſiaſm, can poſſeſs the minds of Britons with an idea; that the efforts of every individual, is not only eſſential, but ſalutary to the great work of preſervation; not ſo much of themſelves, as the Empire.

As the ſervice of the military, is but a ſecondary conſideration to the navy in this great conteſt; an attention to this principle, would enable us to purchaſe ſhipping, if we could not build them: would enable us to recruit the fleet upon any emergency.—There is no man, no regiment, that would not prefer the dangers and inconveniency of the watery element, to the inactivity of an unwholeſome climate.

It is not, that this principle of operation will paſs unnoticed and unreprobated. It will offend many. Miniſterial or factious hirelings will be let looſe. Agents, paymaſters, contractors, will ſound the alarm; and the critical reviewers, will eſſay it, in their teſt, with the flux of ridicule. Yet, ſome ſenator, ſome breaſt, glowing with patriotic warmth, may feel the force of transferring the expence and energy, from the military to the naval department; and ſee the neceſſity of relying on that ſtrength, which ſituation, policy and nature points out to us.

FRENCH

FRENCH POLICY.

The French were not jealous of our commerce, no more than they were of the Dutch, but when they ſaw us extend our Empire, and make conqueſt and power more than commerce our attention in all parts of the globe, they looked upon us as a rival, againſt whom, every ſubject of the Grand monarch, became a principle. The force of treaties, are no further binding than they are convenient. The Emperor, within this month, has turned out all the Dutch garriſons from the frontier towns, without any regard to the treaties ſubſiſting.

France in her exertions, has very little to loſe, yet a very great game to win; her finances may be exhauſted, but her marine cannot be reduced lower than it was at the laſt peace; great has been her exertions, greater our inattention and ſupineneſs.—France has no Provinces to loſe; whereas, on our greateſt ſucceſs, we are ruined in our finances, and we ſhall gain nothing but blows if we keep our own. On the contrary, if we fail of ſucceſs, the French will gain property, power, and glory, and her views then, with her command of the Ocean, will be the univerſal Monarchy, however prepoſterous. Their attention turned to their navy; is a proof of great abilities in their Cabinet; and their expences contend in that one point, will enable their finances to hold out longer than ours: The reſources of France when exerted are endleſs. And their ſucceſſes will open the heart—whereas miſcarriages, diſappointments, and diſgraces, damps and contracts the ſpirit of public inclinations.

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The Italian powers, and the Baltic, I mean the Emperor, Ruſſia, Sweden, and Denmark, enjoy themſelves with our humiliation; a ſatisfaction, that our overbearing inſolence richly deſerves—they cannot however remain ſpectators long, they muſt ſoon be rouſed, and perceive that their jealouſy of us, as a commercial ſtate, is more ſufferable than their ſituation would be, was France triumphant. The ambition of the houſe of Bourbon will never ſubſide: How often have they diſturbed the peace of Europe, and what power in Europe has not, at times, implored and received our protection; if we can but once more deſtroy the French Navy, the perfidy of theſe times, I hope will not be forgot. It therefore behoves us to purſue their marine, and not quit them, until they are interdicted from waſhing their hands in the American ſeas.

The policy of the French have ever been deeper than ours, but in no time with greater eclat than this war. Secret in their own councils, well informed in ours, their military plans well laid, and generally as well executed;—when they fail, it is the fortune of the wind, and accident, not conduct, that has betrayed and occaſioned their miſcarriage.

The policy of their cabinet claims likewiſe a ſuperiority; by its artifice, two allies are engaged in the conteſt againſt us. The Spaniards and Dutch; we have not a ſingle ally—and every other power in Europe, by their armed neutrality, favourable to them and negative to us.—The French have great advantages over us, in as much as an offenſive war has over a defenſive. An offenſive enemy can aſſume a thouſand ſhapes, and make us vulnerable in every part; whereas, defence can at beſt claim but a negative merit, and is always playing a loſing game.—I cannot too

ſtrongly

ſtrongly inculcate the idea of relaxing our reſentment; our operations againſt America, and withdrawing our troops, and pointing our whole force, attention, and expence, to the navy.

We ſhould, of all things reconcile a peace with the Dutch, or at leaſt a ceſſation of hoſtilities for two years, but I fear it is not practicable; they will certainly ſend a fleet to Hudſon's Bay, that trade is become eſſential to this metropolis, in its oil and other things, that we could better ſpare the luxuries of the Eaſt, than that Northern branch of our commerce.——Deſtroying the ſtores in Euſtatia was a bold and politic ſtroke, but that was being bold only by halves, not complete.—At the ſame time we ſhould have ſent a fleet to the Texel, and deſtroyed their ſhipping, even to Amſterdam.

As the foregoing encomium on French policy is true, ſo let it inſtruct.——Engliſh courage has ſurmounted great things; yet, in the magnitude of ſo great a war, ſecret councils, reſolute perſeverance, will beſt ſecure execution and ſucceſs. As preſervation is the end of conqueſt, we ſhould look for it in conquering the French navy.

The ſtruggle is as important to the other powers of Europe, as political conſequences can make it; their forbearance proves, not only their jealouſy of us, but likewiſe their opinion that our pride is not ſufficiently humbled, and our power not ſufficiently weakened by the conteſt: they likewiſe ſeem to ſtand in dread of the power of the houſe of Bourbon, elſe, why ſuffer hoſtilities to diſturb the Levant trade: Where is that

gratitude which the Emperor ſhould have ſucked, when his mother held him in her arms, when ſhe made a ſpeech to her troops, at the time that Lord Foreſter relieved her diſtreſſes with £40,000 from this kingdom.—Naples, Sardinia, and all the Italian powers, ſhould have interfered, and not allowed the Belligerents to enter the Streights.——The fleets of the houſe of Bourbon, were it not for England, would not only give law to the Levant, but ſoon make a partition of the Italian ſtates: There is no power in Europe but would feel the ſhock, if Spain recovered Gibraltar; even France, with all its artifice, would privately reprobate ſuch an acquiſition.

TO THE

SELF KNOWN:

MY LORD,

I Am perſuaded, your own option decides whether you are to continue the Miniſter or not.——The rod of JUNIUS has left too feeling a ſmart behind, to be forgot; nor is there a Miniſter ſo hardy, as to provoke a return of correction, which JUNIUS only can inflict.——I yet think, the concealed JUNIUS could render more eſſential ſervice to this country than the avowed Miniſter.——I ſhould advance what I could not prove, were I to pronounce your Lordſhip to be JUNIUS, but I am convinced you can command the pen of JUNIUS.

FINIS.